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BURIED ALIVE: THE EXISTENCE OF ASSIGNEE
ESTOPPEL IN PATENT LAW
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a big pharmaceutical company and the patent for
Viagra has just expired. Inventors on your research and development
team come up with a new compound that does not have the same side
effects as Viagra. This is an exciting, and potentially lucrative inven-
tion so the inventors apply for patent protection. Luckily for you, the
inventors are subject to an assignment clause in their employment
contract and you become the assignee of the patented compound. You
spend years enjoying your sales of the product. But all of a sudden,
you elect to destroy the patent and challenge its validity. Why do such
a thing?
It is a rare occurrence where an assignee of a patent would want to
challenge the validity of its own patent. One could analogize the situa-
tion to a property owner who wants to commit arson and destroy her
own home. But situations do arise where an assignee would want to
challenge the validity of its own patents, and it remains a questionable
option.
The doctrine of assignee estoppel is an unarmed guard that blocks
passage to the gates of a patent validity challenge. Courts have de-
fined assignee estoppel as “an equitable doctrine based in contract law
that precludes an assignee of a patent from later asserting that the
patent is invalid”.1 It is the assignee, not the assignor, who bears the
burden of challenging the validity of the patent and is faced with the
obstacle of assignee estoppel. Placing the burden on the assignee re-
mains counterintuitive, and courts have taken notice of the legally
awkward position of simultaneously attacking and defending the va-
lidity of the same patent.2
Application of this doctrine is most closely related to, and typically
turns on, the Supreme Court decision in Lear v. Adkins, which abro-
gated the doctrine of licensee estoppel.3 Licensee estoppel occurs
when the licensor of a patent sues to collect royalties from the licen-
1. MACOM Tech. Sol. Holdings, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, No. 2:16-cv-02859-CAS, 2017 WL
3298670, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2017).
2. See Diamond Sci. Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1224–25 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
3. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 674 (1969).
195
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see, and the licensee is prohibited from raising the defense of patent
invalidity.4 In Lear, the public policy goal of encouraging the full and
free use of patent validity challenges reached its pinnacle.5 Yet, courts
still seem to override Lear when electing to apply assignee estoppel.6
A closer look reveals that there are strong similarities between an as-
signee and a licensee, especially when a dispute involves royalty pay-
ments. So, courts that find a distinction between an assignee and a
licensee, and seek to apply assignee estoppel, blatantly disregard the
express policy considerations of Lear.7
In MACOM Technology Solutions Holdings, Inc. v. Infineon Tech-
nologies AG, the Central District of California denied a motion to
strike and elected to apply assignee estoppel on the basis that it did
not bar an assignee from asserting the validity of its own patents.8 It
had been thirteen years since the issue of assignee estoppel had been
raised and the court specifically noted that the doctrine of assignee
estoppel “is not exactly a jurisprudential fixture.”9 But decisions that
have applied assignee estoppel, though decided much earlier than
MACOM, remain good law.
The premise of this Comment is that the doctrine of assignee estop-
pel is a dead doctrine and assignees should be free to challenge the
validity of the patents they own. Part I will discuss the legislative his-
tory of the Patent Act, along with the initial policy concerns for the
validity of patents. To support the facts of the assignee estoppel cases,
this Part will also provide an anatomical review of patent assignments
and licenses. Then, it will cover the precedential case of Lear v. Ad-
kins and proceed into the line of cases that makes up the doctrine of
assignee estoppel.
Part II puts a spotlight on the confusion of the courts and why they
fail to acknowledge the express policy concerns in Lear when electing
to apply assignee estoppel. This Part argues for a proper approach, in
which courts should abrogate the doctrine of assignee estoppel to
reach the merits of a validity challenge and honor the policy concerns
of Lear. It will also show that a party who raises patent invalidity
should not be subject to both assignee estoppel and the presumption
of validity that a patent carries.
4. Id. at 678–79 n.1.
5. Patricia Stanford, Diamond Sci. Co. v. Ambico, Inc.: Enforcing Patent Assignor Estoppel,
26 HOUS. L. REV. 761, 768 (1989).
6. See Coast Metals, Inc. v. Cape, No. 78-276, 1979 WL 25083, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 24, 1979).
7. Id. at *4.
8. MACOM Tech. Sol. Holdings, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, No. 2:16-cv-02859-CAS, 2017 WL
3298670, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2017).
9. Id at 3.
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Part III covers the impact of abrogating assignee estoppel and the
importance of permitting validity challenges. A broader view of the
patent system and its purposes is explored as well as its relationship
with assignee estoppel.
This Comment concludes with the idea that, in view of Lear, parties
should be free to challenge the validity of their patents and reach the
merits of a validity challenge, so that the public does not pay for false
innovation.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Legislative History of the Patent Act and Patent Validity
James Madison, the original proponent of the federal patent system,
called for a centralized system for regulating patents where inventors
could receive protection for their innovations, exploit the fruits of
their labor, and avoid the hurdles of varying state laws.10 Through his
efforts, in 1789, the Constitution of the United States was enacted and
gave Congress the power “to promote the [p]rogress of the science
and useful arts, by securing for limited time to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”11 In
response, the first federal patent statute was passed in 1790 and con-
ferred the power to issue patents onto a board of individuals consist-
ing of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney
General.12 When these officials became too busy with their other du-
ties, Congress passed the Patent Act of 1793, which made patent issu-
ance a largely administrative function.13
The Patent Act of 1793 proved to be an obstacle to an efficient pat-
ent system and was a disservice to most inventors.14 Under the Act,
anyone who paid the fee and met the filing requirements was destined
to receive a patent—even without much consideration of patentability
requirements, such as novelty.15 Congress soon became concerned
with the patent system and took note of the “evils” that resulted from
issuing invalid patents without examination of their merits or nov-
elty.16 Of the four highlighted “evils” discussed in a Senate Report
from 1836, most notable is the issuance of “worthless and void . . .
[patents that] conflict with, and infring[e] upon . . . public rights not
10. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
12. S. DOC. NO. 24-338, at 2 (1836).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 4.
15. Id. at 2.
16. Id. at 2–3.
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subject to patent privileges . . . .”17 The Senate, however, addressed
this problem by developing a committee, which created a new bill that
passed in 1836.18 This bill created a Commissioner of Patents and a
unit of examiners that would raise the threshold for obtaining patents
and thereby increase the strength of the federal patent system.19
The most recent version of the Patent Act was passed in 1952 when
Congress codified Title 35 of the United States Code.20 The Act re-
mains fairly unchanged from the Patent Act of 1836 with only a few
portions undergoing a language update.21 The Supreme Court has
clearly emphasized the legislative intent of the Patent Act and has
further elaborated on its purposes by declaring that:
(1) [P]atent law seeks to foster and reward invention, (2) it pro-
motes disclosure of inventions, to stimulate further innovation and
to permit the public to practice the invention once the patent ex-
pires, and (3) the stringent requirements for patent protection seek
to assure that ideas in the public domain remains there for the free
use of the public.22
17. Id. at 3 (“Under the act referred to, the Department of State has been going on for more
than forty years, issuing patents on every application, without any examination into the merit or
novelty of the invention. And the evils which necessarily result from the law as it now exists,
must continue to increase and multiply daily till Congress shall put a stop to them. Some of them
are as follows:
1. A considerable portion of all the patents granted are worthless and void, as conflicting with,
and infringing upon one another, or upon public rights not subject to patent privileges; arising
either from a want of due attention to the specifications of claim, or from the ignorance of the
patentees of the state of the arts and manufactures, and of the inventions made in other coun-
tries, and even in our own.
2. The country becomes flooded with patent monopolies, embodied on all sides; and not less
embarrassing to the community generally, in the use of even the most common machinery and
long-known improvements in the arts and common manufactures of the country.
3. Out of this interference and collision of patents and privileges, a great number of lawsuits
arise, which are daily increasing in an alarming degree, onerous to the courts, ruinous to the
parties, and injurious to society.
4. It opens the door to frauds, which have already become extensive and serious. It is repre-
sented to the committee that it is not uncommon for persons to copy patented machine in the
model-room; and, having made some slight immaterial alterations, they apply in the next room
for patents. There being no power given to refuse them, patents are issued of course. Thus pre-
pared, they go forth on a retailing expedition, selling out their patents rights for States, counties,
and townships, to those who have no mans at hand of detecting the imposition, and who find,
when it is too late, that they have purchased what the vendors had no right to sell, and which
they obtain thereby no right to use. This speculation in patent rights has become a regular busi-
ness, and several hundred thousand dollars, it is estimated, are paid annually for void patents,
many of which are thus fraudulently obtained.”).
18. S. DOC. NO. 24-338, at 1 (1836).
19. Id. at 2.
20. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 2 (1952).
21. Id.
22. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 257 (1979).
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By the same token, invalid patents provide no benefit to the pub-
lic.23 The Supreme Court has often commented about the great public
importance of having invalid patents invalidated.24 The Court has
stated, “A patent yielding returns for a device that fails to meet the
congressional imposed criteria of patentability is anomalous.”25 This
emphasis is based on the public’s interest in “having invalid patents
invalidated so that a patentee may not thwart lawful competition with
improper threats of enforcement.”26 Not only that, but the Court has
gone to great lengths to state that the question of validity has an even
greater public importance than the question of infringement.27 The
Federal Circuit has expressed the same sentiment.28 In Patlex Corp. v.
Mossinghoff, the court stated, “[T]he grant of a valid patent is prima-
rily a public concern. Validity often is brought into question in dis-
putes between private parties, but the threshold question usually is
whether the PTO [Patent and Trademark Office], under the authority
assigned to it by Congress, properly granted the patent.”29 Indeed,
once the threshold has been met, there are still economic considera-
tions of patent validity that the Federal Circuit—mindful of the effect
on competitors—continues to uphold.30 These considerations are
often negative and involve deterrent factors of challenging an invalid
patent.31 Whether a competitor does not want to pay the substantial
cost of litigation or merely does not want to risk the potential loss of
profit during the pendency of litigation, invalid patents are seen as a
significant threat.32 Moreover, a patent’s presumption of validity
stands as a high barrier to any patent challenger.33
23. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971) (“A patent
yielding returns for a device that fails to meet the congressionally imposed criteria of patentabil-
ity is anomalous.”).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, JR., ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST §15:2, Westlaw (database up-
dated July 2019) [hereinafter MATTHEWS, JR., §15:2].
27. Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330 (1945) (“[O]f the two
questions [infringement or validity], validity has the greater public importance and the District
Court in this case followed what will usually be the better practice by inquiring fully into the
validity of this patent.”) (citation omitted).
28. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
29. Id.
30. Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap, S.A.R.L., 412 F.3d 1284, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See generally Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 93 (2011).
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The rate of patent invalidation in the United States appears to be
increasingly high.34 Nearly forty-six percent of all patents litigated to
judgment are held to be invalid.35 Due to this, scholars have identified
multiple reasons that lead to the invalidation of patents. At first
glance, guilt falls on the inefficiency of the system for granting pat-
ents.36 The Patent Office is routinely criticized as being a “rubber
stamp” for patents and frequently issuing the majority of applica-
tions.37 Another factor, more pertinent to assignee estoppel, involves
the vast changes in substantive patent law on which a patent can be
invalidated.38 Academics have noted that “courts at different times
could reach opposite decisions on the validity of the same patent
based on the relevant patent laws of that particular period of time.”39
Yet allowing such validity challenges serves the public’s interest in the
free flow of ideas.40 It also provides an outlet that relieves the public
from the ever-evolving patent laws of the United States that, at any
point in time, could place the public at the mercy of paying for an
invalid patent.41
An alternative view suggests that the public policy encouraging pat-
ent validity challenges has run its course.42 Economic uncertainty in
the patent system can stem from an open season of validity challenges,
thereby deterring potential investors or patentees from entering into
long-term research and development commitments.43 A slippery slope
could, in effect, result in decreased investments in technology and
cause a spiraling economic decline.44 While the possession of unrelia-
ble and invalid patents has resulted in a loss of confidence in the past,
34. See e.g., John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Liti-
gants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 678 (2011); Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringe-
ment Cases?, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 5–6 (2006) (finding that patentees win only 25% of cases litigated
to judgment, in part because of invalidity and in part because of noninfringement); John R.
Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA
Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (finding that 46% of patents litigated to judgment are held invalid).
35. Allison et al., supra note 34, at n.1; Janicke & Ren, supra note 34, at 5; Allison & Lemley,
supra note 34, at 205.
36. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring
2005, at 75, 83.
37. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J.
181, 181–82 (2008).
38. Stijepko Tokic, Impact of Legal (Un)certainty on Patent Valuation: What Investors Should
Know Before Investing in Patents, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 363, 369 (2013).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and The Incentive
to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REV. 677 (1986).
43. Id. at 680.
44. Id.
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remarks from the patent community note that this barely inhibits
competition in the United States.45 And yet, parties continue to pose
validity challenges. More recently, the Supreme Court, in Oil States
Energy Services, L.L.C. v. Greene’s Energy Group, has buttressed this
policy concern by upholding alternative administrative forums for pat-
ent validity challenges.46 With more options available, patent validity
challenges remain extant in the realm of patent law, even for an
assignee.
For assignees subject to assignee estoppel, the legislative history of
§ 261, and the entirety of the Patent Act, is silent with respect to
whether an assignee can undergo a validity challenge of its own pat-
ent.47 The Senate committee report accompanying the Patent Act of
1952 only reports that the language of § 261 was derived from the
prior statute of 1836.48 This legislative silence indicates that Congress
most likely did not consider a situation where an assignee would want
to challenge the validity of its own patent.
B. An Overview of Patent Assignments and Licenses
The patent statute governing assignments states, in relevant part,
that:
Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein shall be as-
signable in law by an instrument in writing. The applicant, patentee,
or his assigns or legal representatives may in like manner grant and
convey an exclusive right under his application for patent, or pat-
ents to the whole or any specified part of the United States.49
Thus, a patent grants the holder the right to exclude anyone from
making, selling, using, offering for sale, or importing into the United
States the patented invention.50 A patentee yields a bundle of rights
but can be contractually, and expressly, limited by its own actions.
First, a patentee may separately license any of the exclusionary rights
of its patents and may do so based on geographic territory.51 Second,
“the right to manufacture, the right to sell, and the right to use are
each substantive rights and may be granted or conferred separately by
the patentee.”52 Third, a patentee is subject to the contractual obliga-
45. Stanford, supra note 5, at 771.
46. See generally Oil States Energy Servs., L.L.C. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365
(2018); see also SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1352 (2018).
47. See S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394; H.R. REP. NO. 82-
1923 (1952).
48. See S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), at 27 (app’x), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2421.
49. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012).
50. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873).
51. 35 U.S.C. § 261.
52. Adams, 84 U.S. at 456.
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tions of the exclusionary rights of the patent, the limitations of the
claims, and the requisite patent term.53 Fourth, patentees enjoy a de-
gree of freedom in the type of consideration they may demand for
transferring ownership, whether it be in any “species or kind of prop-
erty.”54 And fifth, a patentee may transfer title in a patent by assign-
ment, and give up his entire interest.55 Pursuant to § 100(d) of the
Patent Act,56 the Federal Circuit has clarified that a patentee is synon-
ymous with a “legal title holder”; and includes not only the patentee
to whom the patent was issued, but any successor in title to the
patentee.57
Agreements transferring patent rights must be in the form of an
assignment or a license.58 When a patentee transfers title in a patent
by assignment, the assignee is the effective patentee under the Patent
Act.59 This transfer of title can occur between the time of an invention
and throughout the prosecution of a patent, right up until issuance.60
An inventor can also complete an assignment of rights prior to an
invention; this is known as an expectant interest and courts find this to
be a valid method of assignment.61 Subsequent to issuance, a patent
assignee can obtain title subject to certain requirements.62 Most of
53. McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“A patent confers on
its holder the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling what is described in its
claims. [T]hese intellectual property rights, like any other property rights, are subject to the
contractual obligations of their owner and the applicable law. . .”) (citations omitted).
54. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 642 (1947) (“Con-
gress has made all patents assignable and has granted the assignee the same exclusive rights as
the patentee. ‘Every application for patent or patent or any interest therein shall be assignable in
law by an instrument in writing, and the applicant or patentee or his assigns or legal representa-
tives may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his application for patent or
patent to the whole or any specified part of the United States.’ The statute does not limit the
consideration which may be paid for the assignment to any species or kind of property. At least
so far as the terms of the statute are concerned, we see no difference whether the consideration
is services or cash, or the right to use another patent.”).
55. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012).
56. 35 U.S.C. § 100(d) (2012).
57. § 261; Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1578 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The
entity to whom the grant of a patent is made by the PTO [or that entity’s successor in title] holds
the ‘legal title’ to the patent. The legal title holder may or may not be the inventor, according to
whether provision has been made by the inventor for issuance to an assignee. Thus defined,
‘legal title holder’ is synonymous with ‘patentee’ as defined by 35 U.S.C. §?100(d): The word
‘patentee’ includes not only the patentee to whom the patent was issued but also the successors
in title to the patentee.”) (citations omitted).
58. CMS Indus., Inc. v. L.P.S. Int’l, Ltd., 643 F.2d 289, 294 (5th Cir. 1981) (conveyance of
interests in patents typically constitutes either assignment or licenses).
59. Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
60. FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
61. Id.
62. Id. (The assignee “must be in fact a purchaser for valuable consideration. This require-
ment is different from the classic notion of a purchaser under a deed of grant, where the require-
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-1\DPL102.txt unknown Seq: 9  5-FEB-20 12:19
2019] BURIED ALIVE 203
these assignments are conveyed in the form of an entire patent, an
undivided part or share of the entire patent, or all rights under the
patent in a specified geographical region of the United States.63 Any-
thing less than a complete transfer of rights is a license, not an assign-
ment.64 But the reservation or exception by an assignor of a mere
personal right to use the patented invention, resulting in a license
back to the assignor from the assignee, will not cause the transfer of
rights to be deemed a license.65 Also, a crucial administrative task is
the requirement to record the assignment “in the Patent and Trade-
mark Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of
such subsequent purchase or mortgage”—otherwise the assignment
will be void.66
While an assignment of patent rights operates to transfer title to the
assignee, a license leaves the title in a patent-owner. A patent license
is essentially a permission for the licensee to perform acts that, with-
out the license, would be deemed acts of infringement.67 In general,
patent licenses vary in their forms of exclusivity and consist of either a
non-exclusive or an exclusive license.68 A non-exclusive license is de-
fined as a license that grants the holder a right to make, use, sell, or
offer to sell the patented invention, but does not give the holder any
exclusionary rights.69 If anything, a non-exclusive license is merely an
agreement by the licensor to receive royalties from the licensee in ex-
change for a covenant not to sue or disturb the licensee’s activities.70
Conversely, an exclusive license is an agreement where the patentee
grants a license to a party—by an express or implied promise—for an
exclusionary right of the patent and thereby promises not to grant any
other licenses to other parties.71 These exclusive licensees then receive
ment of consideration was a formality, and the proverbial peppercorn would suffice to have the
deed operate under the statute of uses. Here the requirement is that the subsequent purchaser,
in order to cut off the rights of the prior purchaser, must be more than a donee or other gratui-
tous transferee. There must be in fact valuable consideration paid so that the subsequent
purchase can, as a matter of law, claim record reliance as a premise upon which the purchase was
made. . . In addition, the subsequent transferee/assignee . . . must be without notice of any such
prior assignment.”).
63. Enzo APA & Son, Inc. v. Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
64. Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 1567, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
65. Hook v. Hook & Ackerman, Inc., 187 F.2d 52, 57 n.5 (3d Cir. 1951).
66. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012).
67. U.S. Philips Corp. v. Int’l Trade Com’n, 424 F.3d 1179, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
68. Ulead Sys., Inc. v. Lex Comput. & Mgmt. Corp. 351 F.3d 1139, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
69. Id.
70. MedImmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc., 409 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted,
judgment vacated on other grounds, and remanded in view of, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007).
71. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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more substantial rights than a non-exclusive licensee. When a paten-
tee has granted an exclusive license, if it has not reserved for itself a
right to practice the patented invention, the patentee is prohibited
from practicing the patented invention.72 Therefore, the exclusive li-
censee has the sole right to enjoin acts of infringement because the
patentee no longer has the right to practice the patent in any field of
use.73
A practical difference between an assignment and a license is in the
form of consideration. Most licensees pay royalties over the term of
the license subject to many contractual provisions; assignees, on the
other hand, typically pay lump sum payments at the time of the assign-
ment.74 But assignees, as discussed below, can often make payments in
the form of recurring royalties, which serve to blur the lines between a
licensee and assignee.75 More analogous to royalties, many inventors/
assignors receive consideration for assignments in the form of continu-
ing employment.76 In that regard, bi-weekly or monthly paychecks can
seem more like periodic royalty payments.77
A greater difference is seen in the power to sue for infringement.
Standing to sue for patent infringement is granted by the Patent Act,
which provides that “[a] patentee shall have remedy by civil action for
infringement of his patent.”78 To that end, when a patentee transfers
all substantial rights under the patent, the transferee will be deemed
the effective patentee under the statute and has standing to bring suit
in its own name.79 On the other end of the spectrum is the non-exclu-
sive licensee who maintains no ability to bring a suit for patent in-
fringement and cannot gain standing by joining the patentee as a
party.80 An exclusive licensee, while not receiving a transfer of all sub-
stantial rights in the patent, still possesses part of the bundle of rights
to exclude others and therefore has a legally protected interest.81 In
turn, the exclusive licensee can join the patent owner in an action
against an accused infringer, but cannot sue a party by itself.82
72. Barnett v. Strom, 265 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949–50 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
73. Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Prod., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 931, 937 (D.N.J. 1983).
74. See Stanford, supra note 5, at 769.
75. See Coast Metals, Inc. v. Cape, No. 78-276, 1979 WL 25083, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 24, 1979).
76. See Stanford, supra note 5, at 769.
77. Id.
78. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012).
79. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
80. See Abbott Labs. v. Diamedix Corp., 47 F.3d 1128, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also Propat
Int’l Corp. v. Rpost, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1193–94 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v.
TCI Cablevision of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
81. Ortho Pharm., 52 F.3d at 1030.
82. Id. at 1030–31.
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Strangely, and perhaps more applicable to assignee estoppel, a paten-
tee who grants an exclusive license without reserving for itself a right
to practice the invention can be liable to the licensee for patent in-
fringement.83 This is the exception to the rule that an exclusive licen-
see must join a patent owner in order to gain standing to sue.84
C. The Lear Analogy: Licensee Estoppel
An overview of assignee estoppel begins with the Supreme Court
decision in Lear v. Adkins.85 Courts that determine whether to apply
assignee estoppel typically address Lear’s holding and policy ratio-
nale.86 In Lear, Adkins licensed a patent application to Lear for steel
gyroscopes in exchange for royalties.87 The contract provided that
Lear could terminate the license if no patent had issued or if the is-
sued patent was held invalid.88 As the application was making its way
through the Patent Office, Lear stopped paying royalties after discov-
ering anticipatory prior art. The prior art alone was enough to make
Lear question the validity of the application, but, in addition, Lear
reviewed the prosecution history and identified multiple rejections
from the examiner.89 Despite its cessation of royalty payments, Lear
continued to manufacture and sell the licensed invention.90
When the patent finally issued, Adkins sued under contract for roy-
alties.91 Lear raised patent invalidity as a defense and argued that it
stopped paying royalties because its manufactured product did not
embody the patented invention, which nonetheless, it believed to be
invalid.92 The Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of licensee estop-
pel, which barred a licensee from challenging the validity of its own
patent, thereby permitting a licensee to avoid royalty payments to the
owner of an invalid patent.93 In turn, the Court ignored the provisions
of the contract which precluded a challenge to patent validity and held
83. Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255 (1891) (An exclusive licensee that does not
have all substantial rights does have standing to sue in his own name when “necessary to prevent
an absolute failure of justice, as where the patentee is the infringer, and cannot sue himself.”);
see also Littlefield v. Perry, 88 U.S. 205, 223 (1874).
84. Waterman, 138 U.S. at 255.
85. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 662–63 (1969).
86. See e.g., MACOM Tech. Sol. Holdings, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, No. 2:16-cv-02859-CAS,
2017 WL 3298670, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2017) (reviewing decisions that analogize or distin-
guish Lear v. Adkins).
87. Lear, 395 U.S. at 657.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 659.
90. Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 882, 897–98 (1967), vacated, 395 U.S. 653, 676 (1969).
91. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 660 (1969).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 670.
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that the laws of contract must give way to the express federal policy of
the patent laws.94 The Court stated the policy rationale in subverting
such contract provisions to permit a licensee to bring a validity
challenge:
[T]he equities of the licensor do not weigh very heavily when they
are balanced against the important public interest in permitting full
and free competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of
the public domain. Licensees may often be the only individuals with
enough economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an in-
ventor’s discovery. If they are muzzled, the public may continually
be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or
justification. We think it plain that the technical requirements of
contract doctrine must give way before the demands of the public
interest in the typical situation involving the negotiation of a license
after a patent has issued.95
The decision in Lear requires a court to consider the strong public
interest in the free flow of ideas when faced with a contract that at-
tempts to limit a party’s right to challenge the validity of a patent.96
While Lear is acknowledged for its holdings on the doctrine of licen-
see estoppel and the enforcement of contracts for royalties, it also es-
tablished a “balancing of the equities” test, which weighs the public
interest in discovering invalid patents against other competing inter-
ests, such as contract provisions of an agreement.97
D. A Brief and Interrupted History of Assignee Estoppel
1. Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Company: The Beginning
One of the first assignee estoppel cases involved Roberts, a young
sales clerk who was working at Sears and had developed the famous
quick-release socket wrench.98 Roberts was persuaded by his manager
to report the idea to corporate executives, who soon came to realize
the potential profits and impact that the wrench would have on the
mechanic community.99 Roberts pursued negotiations for royalties
and assigned his rights to Sears in exchange for a 2 cent royalty per
unit for up to a maximum of $10,000 in sales.100 During negotiations,
Sears’ lawyers withheld its knowledge of the wrenches’ potential for
94. Id. at 673.
95. Id. at 670–71.
96. 5 ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, JR., ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 35:38, Westlaw (database
updated July 2019).
97. Id.
98. Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 573 F.2d 976, 978 (7th Cir. 1978).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 979.
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success.101 However, at the time of negotiations and before the con-
tract was executed, Sears had already filed the patent for the wrench
and it had been issued.102
Between 1965 and 1975, Sears sold over 19 million wrenches at $2
profit per wrench.103 Roberts filed suit and a jury found Sears guilty of
fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of a confidential relationship.104
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Sears argued that if the district
court had found the patent invalid, Roberts would not have been in-
jured by Sears’s fraudulent activity because Sears would have been
paying $10,000 for a “worthless” invention.105 The court held that an
assignee could not challenge the validity of its own patent and that the
rejection of licensee estoppel in Lear did not apply.106 The court dis-
tinguished an assignee from a licensee by stating that an assignee gets
a total assignment of rights, whereas a licensor maintains its rights.107
The outcome that the Lear Court tried to avoid—that the public
might have to pay tribute to a would-be monopolist—was inapplicable
because Roberts would have no legal basis for exacting any “tribute”
until the patent rights were assigned back to him.108 The court further
circumvented Lear by declining to balance the equities between the
public’s interest and contract law, because unlike Lear, the contract
was not formed on a good faith belief and the public would not be
injured by barring Sears’ (the assignee’s) validity challenge.109
2. Cases from the 1980s and 1990s: An Evolution
Other assignee estoppel cases from the 1980s and 1990s involve as-
signees attempting to repudiate royalty payments.110 District courts
elected to apply assignee estoppel on the grounds that “a buyer of a
patent could obtain its benefits and control it and refuse to pay the
agreed consideration”.111 These courts disfavored the legal awkward-
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 980.
104. Roberts, 573 F.2d at 980.
105. Id. at 980–81.
106. Id. at 981.
107. Id. at 982.
108. Id. at 982.
109. Id.
110. See Coast Metals, Inc. v. Cape, No. 78-276, 1979 WL 25083, at *4–5 (D.N.J. Dec. 24,
1979); Sybron Transition Corp. v Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle, 770 F. Supp. 803, 809
(W.D.N.Y 1991); see also Baladevon, Inc. v. Abbott Labs. Inc., 871 F. Supp. 89, 97 (D. Mass.
1994).
111. See Coast, 1979 WL 25083, at *4; accord Sybron, 770 F. Supp. at 811.
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ness of assignees being able to attack and defend the same patent.112
By virtue of Lear, the assignee is considered to have a monopoly on
the patent rights and, unlike the licensor in Lear, the assignor is in no
danger of reaping the benefits of a potentially invalid patent that is
likely to go unchallenged.113 Thus, these decisions acknowledged that
“the weight of authority holds that the doctrine of assignee estoppel
survived Lear”.114
3. Assignee Estoppel in the Federal Circuit
Assignee estoppel finally reached the Federal Circuit in 2004 in Slip
Track v. Metal Lite.115 Slip Track was the sole owner of the ‘760 patent
and jointly owned the ‘203 patent with Metal Lite.116 Slip Track sued
Metal Lite for infringement of the ‘760 patent and the district court
held that ‘760 patent had priority over the ‘203 patent.117 On appeal,
the Federal Circuit held that Slip Track, an assignee and fifty percent
owner of the ‘203 patent, could challenge the validity of a patent it
owned jointly.118 Undergoing the balancing test in Lear, the Court did
not find anything inequitable with Slip Track choosing to protect the
greater of its two property interests, the ‘760 patent.119 Walking in the
footsteps of Lear, the Slip Track court held that an assignee could
challenge the validity of its own patent, whether it owned the patent in
its entirety or in-part.120
4. The Return to Federal Court
Assignee estoppel was absent from federal courts for thirteen years
before it reached the Central District of California in 2017 in
MACOM.121 In denying MACOM’s motion to strike, the district court
declined to apply assignee estoppel, specifically noting the uncertainty
about the state of the doctrine.122 In 2010, the parties’ predecessors-in-
interest entered into a purchase agreement where MACOM assigned
112. See Coast, 1979 WL 25083, at *5.
113. See Coast, 1979 WL 25083, at *5; accord Sybron, 770 F. Supp. at 811.
114. Baladevon, 871 F. Supp. at 95.
115. See generally Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal Lite, Inc., 113 F. App’x 930, 933 (2004).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. MACOM Tech. Sol. Holdings, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG., No. 2:16-cv-02859-CAS, 2017
WL 3298670, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2017).
122. Id. at *3 (“The foregoing uncertainty about the state of the doctrine weights against strik-
ing Infineon’s invalidity defense.”).
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fifty-four patents and applications to Infineon.123 As part of the agree-
ment, Infineon agreed to execute a license permitting MACOM to
practice the MACOM patents in certain fields of use, which formed a
non-exclusive license.124 In 2016, MACOM filed suit alleging that In-
fineon had breached the agreement entered into by both parties’
predecessors-in-interest.125 In response, Infineon asserted an affirma-
tive defense of patent invalidity.126 MACOM filed a motion to strike
Infineon’s invalidity defense.127
The court distinguished cases where assignee estoppel barred an as-
signee from escaping royalty payments because, in the case at bar,
MACOM still had rights to practice the invention to the exclusion of
others, and MACOM was not alleging that Infineon was attempting to
avoid royalty payments.128 Ultimately, the court held that assignee es-
toppel was not well suited for resolution at the pleading stage.129 In
order to determine the application of assignee estoppel and apply the
balancing test of Lear, the court acknowledged that it would need
more facts that would come from discovery.130
The latest assignee estoppel decision involves a fact pattern worthy
of the logic games on the LSAT. In Fischell v. Cordis Corp., the pat-
ents-in-suit involved three types of stents used in cardiovascular
medicine that were owned by the Fischell brothers.131 In 1999, the Fis-
chells entered into an assignment agreement with Cordis Corporation
to provide Cordis with the ownership rights to use and sell the stents
in exchange for a one percent royalty “so long as a court of competent
jurisdiction has not held such claim invalid or unenforceable in an un-
appealed or unappealable decision.”132 Cordis also gained the right to
sub-license the Fischells’ stent patents “as long as the appropriate
[one] percent royalty is paid to the Fischells . . . .”133 In 2003, being
vigilant assignors, the Fischells alerted Cordis that certain stents man-
123. Id. at *1.
124. Id. at *2.
125. MACOM Tech. Sol. Holdings, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG., No. 2:16-CV-02859-CAS, 2016
WL 6495373, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2016).
126. MACOM, 2017 WL 3298670, at *1.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *3.
129. Id. at *4 (“Assuming arguendo that assignee estoppel remains good law and might pre-
clude Infineon from asserting an invalidity defense here, the issue is not well suited to resolution
at the pleading stage.”).
130. Id. (“The outcome of that balancing may turn upon factual issues that have not yet devel-
oped in this case.”).
131. Fischell v. Cordis Corp., No. 3:16-cv-00928, 2018 WL 6243251, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 29,
2018).
132. Id.
133. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-1\DPL102.txt unknown Seq: 16  5-FEB-20 12:19
210 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:195
ufactured by Guidant infringed the Fischell patents that had been as-
signed to Cordis.134 In response, Cordis and Guidant settled the issue
and Guidant emerged with a license to the Fischells’ stent patents,
though it was required to pay a royalty to Cordis, who then sent the
payments to the Fischells.135 This came to be known as “pass-through”
payment.136 To muddle the matter, in 2006, Guidant sold its cardiol-
ogy division to Abbott, meaning that Abbott became the licensee.137
Abbott was then required to send royalties to Cordis for “pass-
through” payments to the Fischells, so that Abbott could manufacture
and sell their Xience and Vision stents, which were based on the Fis-
chells’ patents.138 Abbott, in turn, manufactured and sold these stents
to Boston Scientific Corporation, who then re-sold the stents under
their own label.139
In 2010, Cordis, the assignee, sued Boston Scientific Corporation in
the District of Delaware for selling the Promus stent, which allegedly
infringed on the Fischells’ stent patents.140 The district court invali-
dated two of the dependent claims of the Fischells’ ’817 stent patent,
and found that Cordis could not show that the Promus patent in-
fringed the Fischells’ stent patents.141 On appeal, the Federal Circuit
vacated the portion of the district court’s decision that invalidated the
patent claims but upheld the conclusion that there was no infringe-
ment.142 Because the ’817 patent shared the same specification as two
other Fischell patents assigned to Cordis, and the Promus stent shared
the “same metal stent architecture” as Abbott’s Xience and Vision
stents, Abbott stopped paying Cordis royalties for pass-through to the
Fischells.143
The Fischells, in seeking their royalty payments, brought suit in the
District of New Jersey against Cordis for breach of contract.144 Abbott
moved to intervene, asserting patent invalidity as a defense, and the
Fischells filed a motion to strike.145 The Fischells argued that Cordis
and Abbott were estopped from asserting patent invalidity on the ba-
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Fischell, 2018 WL 6243251, at *1.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Fischell, 2018 WL 6243251, at *2.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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sis of assignee estoppel.146 To combat this, Abbott and Cordis argued
that not only is the doctrine of assignee estoppel in serious doubt, but
Abbott was a licensee, and Cordis was no longer an assignee of the
asserted patents.147
Before reaching the contractual aspects of the case, the court stated:
“Based on the uncertainty involved in the applicability of the doctrine
of assignee estoppel, the Court declines to apply it, and therefore, de-
clines to strike Cordis and Abbott’s affirmative defenses of patent in-
validity. . . .”148 In addition, the District of New Jersey was also unsure
whether Cordis actually was an assignee. Cordis claimed that the pat-
ents assigned by the Fischells were no longer owned by Cordis but
were owned by an entirely different company, Cardinal Health Swit-
zerland. And because Abbott had shown that it was a licensee, the
court found in favor of Abbott and Cordis.149
Diving into the 1999 agreement formed between Cordis and the Fis-
chell brothers, the District of New Jersey found it crucial that Cordis
was restricted to paying royalties for valid claims, and valid claims
only.150 Even though the Federal Circuit vacated the decision that
“nullified” the claims of the ’817 patent, it upheld the portion finding
that the Promus patent did not infringe upon the Fischell patents and,
in this respect, “Cordis defended the Fischell patents and lost.”151
Cordis wanted to get out of the contract because the validity of the
patents it owned and continued to pay a royalty for were put in ques-
tion152—Cordis was therefore unsure whether the Fischell patents
could be enforced at all. The court found it unfair to harm Cordis
because “Cordis is not proactively challenging the patents; instead,
they are defending against making a payment for patents whose valid-
ity and enforceability have been questioned.”153 The crux of the deci-
sion was the holding that barring Cordis and Abbott from asserting
the defense of patent invalidity would be contrary to the policy in
Lear: “if a patent may be invalid, it is not fair to treat the patent as if it
is valid, and allow the plaintiffs to continue to receive a royalty when
there may be no valid reason for preferential treatment.”154
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 5.
149. Fischell, 2018 WL 6243251, at *5 (Cordis asserted “that the patents are now owned by
Cardinal Health Switzerland.”).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 6.
154. Id.
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In view of the aforementioned case law, an assignee looking to chal-
lenge the validity of its own patent is left with an unsteady footing.
Courts on both sides note their insecurity with the doctrine but con-
tinue to make determinations on assignee estoppel.155 Applying as-
signee estoppel without a true north has a major, inconsistent impact
on patent validity challenges.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Confusion of the Courts
There seems to be some confusion, or intentionally blurred lines,
between the doctrines of assignee estoppel and assignor estoppel. At
times, courts on both sides of assignee estoppel cite to authority that
pertains to assignor estoppel, particularly the case of Diamond Scien-
tific v. Ambico.156 In Diamond Scientific, the Federal Circuit estab-
lished an equitable balancing test, separate and independent from the
so-called “balancing of the equities” in Lear.157 Specifically, the test
sought to weigh the equities of the contractual relationships between
the parties and determine whether it would be proper to allow a party
to bring an invalidity challenge.158 In contrast, the Court in Lear bal-
anced the equities of the licensor against the “important public inter-
est in permitting the full and free competition in the use of ideas
which are in reality a part of the public domain.”159 This is an impor-
tant distinction. And of course, there is always the notion that an as-
signor is not an assignee.
In Baladevon v. Abbott Laboratories, a district court found that Ab-
bott, the assignee, was estopped from challenging validity of its pat-
ent.160 This was even after discovering that the inventor had published
155. Compare Sybron Transition Corp. v Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle, 770 F. Supp. 803,
810 (W.D.N.Y 1991) (“[I]t has not escaped me that the ‘legal doctrine of assignee estoppel’ is not
exactly a jurisprudential fixture.”), with MACOM Tech. Sol. Holdings, Inc. v. Infineon Tech.
AG., No. 2:16-cv-02859-CAS, 2017 WL 3298670, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2017) (“Although Lear
did not squarely address assignee estoppel as compared to licensee estoppel, ‘[t]he distinction
between licensee estoppel and assignee estoppel [has not always been] logical.’”) (quoting Coast
Metals, Inc. v. Cape, No. 78-276, 1979 WL 25083, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 24, 1979)).
156. Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1224 (1988).
157. Id. (“Courts that have expressed the estoppel doctrine in terms of unfairness and injus-
tice have reasoned that an assignor should not be permitted to sell something and later to assert
that what was sold is worthless, all to the detriment of the assignee.”).
158. Id. at 1225 (“Yet despite the public policy encouraging people to challenge potentially
invalid patents, there are still circumstances in which the equities of the contractual relationships
between the parties should deprive one party (as well as others in privity with it) of the right to
bring that challenge.”).
159. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
160. Baladevon, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 89, 91 (D. Mass. 1994).
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an article disclosing all the embodiments of the claimed invention one
year before filing the application.161 Prior to that, the inventors for
Baladevon had executed an assignment to a company, later bought by
Abbott, that surrendered their entire bundle of rights in exchange for
a royalty fee that provided Baladevon with 2.5% of sales.162 The
agreement provided Abbott with the ability to terminate the agree-
ment, in whole or in part, if the competition in the marketplace pre-
vented the patent’s issuance, or if the patent proved to be invalid.163
When Abbott found out about the article, it attempted to terminate
the agreement and assign the patents back to Baladevon.164 After
Baladevon filed suit against Abbott, which asserted patent invalidity
as a defense, the district court set out to consider the body of law that
governs assignee estoppel. At the outset, the court started on the right
track by discussing case law pertaining to assignee estoppel but some-
where, right in the middle of its analysis, it switched gears to assignor
estoppel without a clear rationale for doing so.165 This of course led it
to “balance the equities” between the parties, rather than the usual
free trade of ideas.166 While the court later considered the policy con-
cerns of Lear, the confusion between an assignor and assignee —and
the case law that governs them—proved to be quite dispositive.
The confusion is most evident in a footnote to the court’s statement:
“The equities strongly favor the application of estoppel in this
case.”167 The footnote reads: “The lines are somewhat blurred, be-
cause—having assigned the patents back to Baladevon—defendant
might now be characterized as the assignor, rather than the assignee.
The taxonomy has no bearing on the inquiry followed by this court. To
avoid confusion, defendant will consistently be referred to as the as-
signee.”168 Here, the court’s understanding of assignor estoppel and
assignee estoppel is simply inapposite. The taxonomy does have bear-
161. Id. (“It came to light that Dr. Sacks had published an article containing ideas embodied
in the enteral feeding device over a year before the first application, a fact that rendered both
patents invalid per se.”).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 95 (“On the other hand, some courts have refused to apply assignor estoppel.
Whether estoppel should be applied in a particular case, the Federal Circuit has suggested,
should be determined by balancing the equities. See Diamond Scientific, 848 F.2d at 1224–25
(justifying application of the generally disfavored doctrine of assignor estoppel.”) (emphasis ad-
ded)) (citation omitted).
166. Baladevon, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 89, 95–96 (D. Mass. 1994) (“There is
no evidence that plaintiff exercised the increased leverage of an anticipated patent monopoly
based on the parties expectation of a high likelihood that valid patents would issue.”).
167. Id. at 95.
168. Id. at 95 n.2.
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ing on the court’s inquiry, since it determines which considerations to
balance. Because Abbott had sent a letter to Baladevon notifying
them of their intent to terminate the agreement and assign the patents
back under the agreement’s termination clause, it was unclear
whether Abbott did actually assign the patents back to Baladevon.169
The court should have conducted further investigation to determine
whether Abbott really was an assignee or assignor instead of arbitrar-
ily assigning them a label. Even if Abbott was considered an assignor,
in which case it would have been appropriate to apply the principles
of assignor estoppel, the court should not have subjected an assignor
to the laws of an assignee. This leads to a difference in policy consider-
ations. For the laws pertaining to an assignor, the contractual equities
are balanced between the parties. For the laws pertaining to an as-
signee, the equities are balanced between the licensor or assignor, and
the public’s interest in the exposure of invalid patents.
Another improper mixture of assignee and assignor takes place in
Coast Metals, Inc. v. Cape, where the District of New Jersey freely
admitted that the differences between licensee estoppel and assignee
estoppel are not always logical.170 Right after that, the court noted,
“Different circuits have reached different results when dealing with
assignor estoppel. The Ninth Circuit . . . found, in a very brief opinion,
that assignee estoppel did not require any different rule than licensee
estoppel.”171 A quick Westlaw search reveals that the Ninth Circuit
was not referring to assignee estoppel but to assignor estoppel, which
does not require any different rule than licensee estoppel.172 Blending
all the doctrines together not only results in a volatile witches’ brew,
but inevitably leads to chaos in the courts, with decisions noting the
instability of the doctrine.173
Other sources of confusion have resulted in improper analysis.
Again, whether this is intentional or not remains to be seen, but even
the two courts that have declined to apply assignee estoppel have
made this error. In MACOM, after the court determined that assignee
estoppel cannot be resolved at the pleading stage, the court cited
169. Id. at 91.
170. Coast Metals, Inc. v. Cape, No. 78-276, 1979 WL 25083, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 24, 1979).
171. Id. at *4 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
172. Coastal Dynamics Corp. v. Symbolic Displays, Inc., 469 F.2d 79, 79 (9th Cir. 1972) (“We
are satisfied that by inference he did rule that the point was without merit and such a result is
required by the dicta in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 89 S. Ct. 1905, 23 L. Ed.2d 610,
wherein licensee estoppel is considered. We are not persuaded that assignor estoppel requires
any different rule. So no purpose could be served by a remand for an express ruling on assignor
estoppel on the facts of this case.”).
173. MACOM Tech. Sol. Holdings, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, No. 2:16-cv-02859-CAS, 2017
WL 3298670, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2017).
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Baladevon: “ ‘Whether estoppel should be applied in a particular case,
the Federal Circuit has suggested, should be determined by balancing
the equities’”.174 Following the trail of breadcrumbs, this phrasing in
Baladevon is citing to Diamond Scientific— an assignor estoppel
case.175 This requires an entirely different “balancing of the equities”
test and equally fails to consider the public interest in the full and free
competition of ideas that belong in the public domain. Other courts,
such as the Federal Circuit in Slip Track, have made the same choice
to cite Diamond Scientific. But there, the facts that gave rise to the
invalidity challenge allowed the court to shy away from an analysis
that took place under assignor estoppel.176 While the MACOM court
still saved itself by performing a short analysis of Lear, and the Slip
Track court distinguished the facts from Diamond Scientific, the issue
needs to be flagged.
Perhaps the courts felt that the facts were more appropriately de-
cided under the principles of assignor estoppel. But why then ignore
cases like Roberts and Coast, which had occurred much earlier and
had provided authority under assignee estoppel? Moreover, why con-
travene the policies of Lear? The concern here is that the public will
continue to pay tribute to an individual who holds an invalid patent.
Considerations of contract law do not apply here.
B. A Dead Doctrine and the Courts’ Misunderstanding of Lear
Notwithstanding the confusion between the application of assignor
and assignee estoppel, courts still seem to miss the target when follow-
ing Lear. If courts applied Lear correctly, they would abrogate the
doctrine of assignee estoppel on the same basis that Lear did away
with licensee estoppel. The overarching mistake that courts seem to
make when applying assignee estoppel involves the misinterpretation
and misapplication of the policy concerns of Lear. These concerns are:
(1) that a patent’s validity might go unchallenged and (2) that the pub-
lic would continue to pay tribute for an invalid patent, and would
174. Id. at *4 (quoting Baladevon, Inc. v. Abbot Labs., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 89, 95 (D. Mass.
1994)).
175. Baladevon, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 89, 95 (D. Mass. 1994) (“Whether
estoppel should be applied in particular case, the Federal Circuit has suggested, should be deter-
mined by balancing the equities. See Diamond Scientific, 848 F.2d at 1224–25 (justifying applica-
tion of the generally disfavored doctrine of assignor estoppel.”)).
176. Slip Track Sys. Inc., v. Metal Lite., 113 F. App’x 930, 933 (2004) (citing Diamond Scien-
tific Co. v. Ambico Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (“[D]espite the public policy
encouraging people to challenge potentially invalid patents, there are still circumstances in which
the equities of the contractual relationships between the parties should deprive one party . . . of
the right to bring a challenge.”).
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therefore be deprived of the full and free competition of ideas that
belong in the public domain.177 In Lear, the court feared that if licen-
sees were barred from making a patent validity challenge, “the public
may continually be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists
without need or justification.”178 The “would-be monopolists” are, of
course, the licensors who would be exacting tribute from the public. In
the case of an assignee, when the bundle of rights is transferred from
an assignor to an assignee, it is the assignee who becomes the “would-
be monopolist” to whom the public pays tribute. When it comes to
holding invalid patents, an assignee is just like a licensor because they
are both putting the public in a position of paying for a product that
actually belongs in the public domain. Moreover, if the assignee is
barred from making a validity challenge, the public is deprived of the
full and free competition of ideas and continues to pay tribute to a
monopolist—even where the assignee continues to sell the claimed in-
vention after discovering that the patent is invalid. In short, and to
reiterate Lear, the concerns for the public outweigh any consideration
of contract law, whether it be in the form of an assignment or a license
or whether it involves repudiation of royalty payments.179
Take Baladevon, for example, which involved an application of as-
signee estoppel.180 The district court initially framed its analysis in
view of Lear and set out to determine whether the two policy concerns
of Lear had any bearing on the case at hand. Yet, they still arrived at a
contrary conclusion.181 Because the inventor’s article had anticipated
the invention, and since there were already competitors on the mar-
ket, the court somehow came to the conclusion that there was no risk
that the patent’s validity would go unchallenged.182 The court also
concluded there was no concern that the “patent monopoly” would
continue to be honored.183 But the fact remains, neither the
Baladevon court, nor any other court had declared the patent inva-
lid.184 After Abbott had learned that the inventor’s discovery was not
177. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 670–71 (“We think it plain that the technical requirements of contract doctrine
must give way before the demands of the public interest in the typical situation involving the
negotiation of a license after a patent has issued.”).
180. Baladevon, 871 F. Supp. at 89.
181. Id. at 96 (“[N]either of the two policy rationales supporting abrogating of estoppel in
Lear are relevant to the weighing of the equities in this case.”).
182. Id.
183. Id. (“Thus, there is obviously no concern, as there was in Lear, that the patent monopoly
would continue to be honored les the defendant be given an incentive to challenge patent
validity.”).
184. Id.
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patentable and that the idea did actually belong to the public and its
competitors, it was Abbott who wanted to challenge the patent’s va-
lidity.185 Barring them from doing so would leave the patent’s validity
unchallenged and would be contrary to the express policies in Lear.
If anything, the incentive to make a validity challenge was that Ab-
bott, the assignee, was no longer able to enforce the validity of that
patent to prevent its competitors from selling the same invention. This
was the main reason why Abbott sought termination of the assign-
ment on the basis of patent invalidity in the first place.186 Although
Abbott continued to sell the claimed invention after discovering the
patent might be invalid, it did not get the opportunity to determine if
the patent actually was invalid.187 This was an instance of the public
continuing to pay tribute to a would-be patent monopolist that held an
invalid patent. While it seems counterintuitive that Abbott would
have to pose a validity challenge, and seemingly admit its own mistake
by declaring its own patent invalid, the concern that a patent’s validity
might go unchallenged still remains.
To avoid the second policy concern of Lear, the Baladevon court
elected to take a contract approach and distinguish royalties in a li-
censing agreement from royalties in an assignment.188 This was the
first step in deviating from Lear. The assignment agreement provided
that Baladevon would be entitled to royalties “regardless of whether
the inventions or improvements were ‘patentable’, regardless of
whether [the] patents issued or not, regardless of the patents’ validity,
[and] regardless of whether defendant retained ownership of the pat-
ents or chose to return them under the termination clause.”189 The
court further distanced itself from Lear when it found that the pay-
ments Baladevon demanded were unlike the payments barred in
Lear.190 The payments in Lear were licensee payments to a licensor
holding an invalid patent, while the payments in Baladevon were not
“derived from ownership of invalid patents.”191 While this may have
been true, the court ignored the impact that an invalid patent has on
185. Id. (“By the time of the defendant’s termination in this case, the patent had already been
widely revealed as invalid and competitive product were on the market.”).
186. Baladevon, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 89, 91–92 (D. Mass. 1994).
187. Id. (“Defendant continued to produce and sell enteral feeding devices under the names
‘Sacks’ and ‘Vines’ without paying the plaintiff any royalties.”).
188. Id. at 96 (“Royalties in a licensing agreement are an ongoing obligation, continually ex-
changed for an ongoing right. By contrast, royalties in an assignment agreement are properly
conceived as deferred consideration for the original conveyance of rights, with the amount of
consideration pegged to the commercial success of the product.”).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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the public. After all, Abbott continued to sell the claimed invention to
the public even after discovering that the patents may have been inva-
lid.192 Though it may seem inequitable and counterintuitive to permit
an invalidity challenge and allow Abbott to repudiate its royalty pay-
ments to Baladevon, it is the public that is at stake here. The public
should not be forced to pay tribute to a would-be monopolist that
continues to exploit an invalid patent. Thus, the court should be con-
cerning itself with the merits of the patent, not the merits of an as-
signee. Permitting an assignee to challenge the validity of its own
patent—irrespective of its conduct—continues to uphold what Lear
set out to prove.
Other courts, like those in Coast and Sybron Transition Corp. v.
Nixon, et al., are distracted by the legally awkward position of an as-
signee when it comes to the possibility of simultaneous enforcement
and invalidation.193 These cases also involve an assignee seeking to
repudiate its royalty payments and rescind its contracts with the as-
signor. Coast Metals, an assignee, sought a declaratory judgment seek-
ing to invalidate a patent that it believed the inventors obtained
fraudulently during prosecution.194 In finding that assignee estoppel
barred Coast Metals from repudiating its royalty payments and chal-
lenging the validity of the assigned patents, the court focused on the
“monopoly” that Coast would have if it was allowed to enforce and
attack the same patent.195 By distinguishing Lear, the Coast court
stated that “Lear was never intended to permit fraudulent and bad
faith action. . . . Otherwise, the buyer of a patent could obtain its ben-
efits and control it and refuse to pay the agreed consideration.”196
This is the same situation, however, when a licensee refuses to pay
royalty payments while still enjoying the benefits of making or using
the claimed invention which, of course, the Supreme Court has
permitted.197
192. Baladevon, 871 F. Supp. at 92.
193. See generally Coast Metals, Inc. v. Cape, No. 78-276, 1979 WL 25083, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec.
24, 1979); Sybron Transition Corp. v. Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle, 770 F. Supp. 803
(W.D.N.Y 1991).
194. Coast, 1979 WL 25083, at *1 (“Plaintiff also alleges defendant Cape knew the nickel
ranges in the application were not critical and therefore the invention was no patentable. Such
acts allegedly constituted fraud on the Patent Office.”).
195. Id. at *5 (“Coast owns the patent. If it were able to bring this suit it would be able to
retain a monopoly while at the same time attacking the patent. No one else could use the ‘494
metal for fear of infringement. Indeed Coast could well be in the position of simultaneously
attacking and defending the patent.”).
196. Id. at *4.
197. See generally MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); see also Lear,
Inc. v. Adkins, 385 U.S. 653, 670–71 (1969).
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The Sybron court, adopting the same reasoning as in Coast, further
elaborated on the scenario of an assignee asserting patent invalidity
by stating that:
[B]ecause under the agreement Sybron gained ownership of the pat-
ent, there would be no danger that [the assignor] could reap bene-
fits from a potentially invalid patent which is likely to go
unchallenged. Thus, the danger articulated in Lear which out-
weighed the licensor’s interest in enforcing the contract and justified
allowing the licensee to avoid royalty payments is nonexistent
here.198
On the surface, the Sybron court is correct in that there is no danger
that an assignor could reap benefits from a potentially invalid pat-
ent.199 But on a more fundamental level, particularly here where there
is still a danger that the assignee could reap benefits from a potentially
invalid patent, the patent remains unchallenged.200 Regardless of who
owns the patent, the assignor or the assignee, or under circumstances
involving a lesser bundle of rights such as with a licensor or licensee,
the public should not pay tribute to a party that holds an invalid pat-
ent. The public should not have to pay for processes, machines, arti-
cles of manufacture, or compounds that are protected by invalid
patents. And the public should not be concerned with parties who
withhold ideas from the public domain.
There is also an effort by the courts to distinguish assignees by the
nature of the cause of action. Claims of patent invalidity in Lear and
Roberts both arose in a defense.201 Strangely, the court in Coast found
this dispositive, because it was the plaintiff that was bringing a declar-
atory judgment action to declare its own patent invalid.202 This al-
lowed the court to avoid applying the principles of Lear. The two
courts that have declined the application of assignee estoppel involved
assignees asserting patent invalidity as a defense and do not shed
much light on the issue.203 The Sybron court, on the other hand, did
not find a distinction between a plaintiff bringing a declaratory judg-
198. Sybron, 770 F. Supp. at 811.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See generally Lear, 385 U.S. at 653 (1969); see also Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 573
F.2d 976, 976–77 (1978).
202. Coast Metals, Inc. v. Cape, No. 78-276, 1979 WL 25083, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 24, 1979)
(“The case before the court is not on point with either Sears or Lear. The case arises differently.
It is a declaratory judgment action seeking a holding that the plaintiff’s own patent is invalid. In
Lear and Sears the claim of patent invalidity was a defense.”).
203. See generally MACOM Tech. Sol. Holdings, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG., No. 2:16-cv-
02859-CAS, 2017 WL 3298670, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2017); Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal Lite,
Inc., 113 F. App’x 930, 933 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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ment action and a party asserting invalidity as a defense.204 But the
Sybron court fell short when it stated that “[i]n either situation, per-
mitting the owner/assignee to assert patent invalidity allows it to es-
cape its obligation to make full payment for the patent it had
purchased.”205 Under that approach, and by returning to contract con-
siderations in the case at bar, the court in Sybron ignored the fact that
the “technical requirements of contract doctrine must give way before
the demands of the public interest . . .”206 This would be contrary to
Lear and would allow an assignee to engage in an improper threat of
enforcement by asserting an invalid patent.207
The final distinction that courts make is between a licensee and as-
signee. This often serves as another method for circumventing the rea-
soning in Lear while appearing to decide the case on contract
principles.208 Most notably is the Sybron court, which analyzed Rob-
erts in view of Lear and stated:
First, while Lear involved a license, Roberts involved a complete
assignment of patent rights to the transferee. This distinction is sig-
nificant because the Lear Court was concerned that if a licensee is
barred from challenging the patent’s validity, it is likely that no one
else will have enough economic incentive to challenge it. Thus, an
invalid patent will likely go unchallenged and the public will con-
tinue to pay “tribute” to the licensor for an invalid patent. No such
danger exists in the assignment context for the simple reason that
the assignor has transferred all the substantial rights in the patent.
The assignor thus has nothing left, and has no legal basis to exact
“tribute” from the public.209
The Sybron court is correct in that the assignor no longer has her
bundle of rights and cannot exact “tribute” from the public. This is
because the assignor would have the same bundle of rights as a licen-
sor until an assignment is made, but would then be giving away such
rights upon assignment. Yet the error occurs when one considers the
public. In the case of an assignment, the person who is exacting “trib-
204. See Sybron Transition Corp. v. Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle, 770 F. Supp. 803, 812
(W.D.N.Y 1991) (“Sybron articulates no reason to justify treating the assignee who uses patent
invalidity as a defensive measure differently from the assignee who uses it as an offensive
measure.”).
205. Id.
206. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 385 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
207. MATTHEWS, JR., §15:2, supra note 26.
208. See Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 573 F.2d 976, 982 (7th Cir. 1978) (“First, we deal
here with a complete assignment of plaintiff’s patent rights to Sears. Thus, the primary evil that
the Court in Lear sought to end that the public might have to pay tribute to a ‘would-be monop-
olist’ is completely irrelevant to this Case. Plaintiff has no legal basis for exacting any ‘tribute’
until the patent rights are returned to him.”) (citations omitted).
209. See Sybron, 770 F. Supp. at 811.
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ute” from the public is no longer the licensor but is actually the as-
signee. Because the assignor no longer has anything left, it is solely for
that reason that the assignee, with her entire bundle of rights, be-
comes the person that the Lear court feared. And under Lear, it is
inconsequential who the public is paying tribute to. The main concern
is that the public is “continually required to pay tribute to would-be
monopolists without need or justification.”210 By barring an assignee
from making an invalidity challenge, the invalid patent remains un-
challenged and the public is left paying tribute to the assignee. While
courts may have difficulty in comparing an assignee to a licensor, ex-
posure of all specious patents outweighs any competing interests.
C. A Proper Approach
The Federal Circuit, though using an assignor estoppel case to guide
its analysis, arrived at a conclusion that reached the merits of a pat-
ent’s invalidity.211 The district court had found that the ’760 patent
(solely owned by Slip Track) had priority over the ’203 patent (jointly
owned by Slip Track and Metal Lite).212 Acknowledging that the case
did not involve an assignee seeking to avoid royalty payments, the
court did not need to adhere to decisions such as Baladevon or
Sybron.213 Prior to the action before the district court, Metal Lite put
Slip Track’s ’760 patent into reexamination before the Patent Office
on the grounds that the ’203 patent had priority over the ’760 pat-
ent.214 It is here, upon reexamination, that Slip Track was at a cross-
roads and was forced to choose between a patent that it owned jointly
or a patent in which it was the sole owner.215 Slip Track elected to
challenge the validity of the patent that it had thought was invalid and
chose to protect the greater of its two property interests.216 Slip Track
was therefore permitted to assert the invalidity of the ’203 patent.217
When the Federal Circuit declined the application of assignee estop-
pel after a determination had been reached by the district court on the
merits of the ’203 patent’s invalidity, the court was merely demon-
210. Lear, 395 U.S. at 670–71.
211. See Slip Track Sys. Inc., v. Metal Lite., 113 F. App’x 930, 933 (2004) (citing Diamond
Scientific Co. v. Ambico Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (“[D]espite the public policy
encouraging people to challenge potentially invalid patents, there are still circumstances in which
the equities of the contractual relationships between the parties should deprive one party . . . of
the right to bring a challenge.”).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 935.
215. Id. at 933.
216. Id.
217. See Slip Track, 113 F. App’x at 933–34.
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strating its respect for the patent laws. The court understood that if
one patent had priority over another, the assignee should be able to
invalidate her own patent because another patent had been filed first.
In MACOM, the court could barely comprehend that assignee es-
toppel was still in effect.218 MACOM had brought suit alleging a
breach of an intellectual property purchase agreement and Infineon
asserted an affirmative defense of patent invalidity.219 In denying
MACOM’s motion to strike, the court distinguished the application of
assignee estoppel by finding that the case did not involve an assignee
asserting invalidity to avoid royalty payments or its obligations to pay
due consideration.220 Another distinction was that the assignment be-
tween MACOM and Infineon was not an assignment of entire rights
but an assignment in part, whereas previous assignee estoppel cases
only dealt with complete assignment of rights.221 In the end, the
court’s determination against application of assignee estoppel was
premised on the instability of the doctrine and the parties’ inability to
resolve the contract dispute at the pleading stage.222 Even though the
court may have been applying a different “balancing of the equities”
test cited in assignor estoppel cases, the court still acknowledged that
“the core reasoning of Lear, that contract principles must sometimes
give way to the public’s interest in the development of ideas in the
public domain has intuitive appeal in both contexts [of assignee and
licensee estoppel], depending upon the facts of the particular case at
bar.”223 The fact that the court focused on the absence of “on-point or
otherwise binding” authority that required application of assignee es-
toppel at the pleading stage suggests that assignee estoppel has not
218. MACOM Tech. Sol. Holdings, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, No. 2:16-cv-02859-CAS, 2017
WL 3298670, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2017) (“Assuming arguendo that assignee estoppel remains
good law and might preclude Infineon from asserting an invalidity defense here, the issue is not
well suited to resolution at the pleading stage.”); Id. at *3 (“The foregoing uncertainty about the
state of the doctrine weighs against striking Infineon’s invalidity defense.”).
219. Id. at *1.
220. Id. at *3.
221. Id. (“However, unlike the assignments at issue in these cases, the assignment here did not
leave MACOM with nothing. MACOM retains some rights to prosecute infringers as well as
practice the Nitronex patents in MACOM’s exclusive field to the exclusion of others.”).
222. Id. at *4 (“Thus, resolution of the doctrine may require the Court to weigh not only the
equities of each parties’ contention about the Purchase Agreement and License Agreement, but
also the circumstances under which those agreements were negotiated and evidence of each
parties’ performance. . . . As an equitable doctrine, application of assignee estoppel may turn
upon equitable considerations that have not yet been developed.”).
223. MACOM, 2017 WL 3298670, at *3.
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survived Lear.224 Thus, if a party is allowed to assert patent invalidity,
even at the pleading stage, assignee estoppel should never be applied.
With all the intricacies of the Fischell decision, the most improved
court award has to go to the District of New Jersey.225 Like MACOM,
the Fischell court was also faced with assignee estoppel on a motion to
strike.226 Except this time, the situation involved the repudiation of
royalty payments where Cordis, though deemed by the court to be a
questionable assignee, was relieved of its obligation to pay royalties to
the Fischell brothers.227 Abbott, as the licensee, was awarded the same
relief.228 With the acknowledgment of a corollary decision by the Fed-
eral Circuit, the patents-in-suit were found to have questionable valid-
ity and the Fischell court permitted Cordis and Abbott to raise the
defense of patent invalidity.229 Among its many reasons for denying
the motion to strike, the Fischell court noted the unstable footing of
the doctrine of assignee estoppel and properly decided to remain on
stable ground. The Fischell court, even before delving into the con-
tractual equities, highlighted the fact that there was “uncertainty in-
volved in the applicability of the doctrine of assignee estoppel.”230
Moreover, the Fischell court had respected the decision of the Federal
Circuit, which had reached the merits of the patents’ validity. Leaving
Cordis and Abbott with a patent that could not be enforced against
the Promus stent, which was found to be non-infringing on the Fis-
chells’ stent patents, would have left an invalid patent to remain in
existence.
What Cordis and Abbott did right was rely on Lear.231 After all, this
is where it all started. This is where the Fischell court began its analy-
sis and ended with the policy concern that “if a patent may be invalid,
it is not fair to treat the patent as if it is valid, and allow the plaintiffs
to continue to receive a royalty when there may be no valid reason for
preferential treatment.”232 To take it one step further, it is not just
224. Id. at *4 (“The absence of on-point or otherwise binding authority here cautions against
granting MACOM’s motion at the pleading stage.”).
225. Fischell v. Cordis Corp., No. 3:16-cv-00928, 2018 WL 6243251, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 29,
2018). Ironically, and some may think of this as contradictory, the District of New Jersey had
previously applied assignee estoppel in Coast Metals, Inc. v. Cape, No. 78-276, 1979 WL 25083, at
*5 (D.N.J. Dec. 24, 1979).
226. Fischell, 2018 WL 6243251, at *2.
227. Id. at *5–6.
228. Id. at *6.
229. Id. at *5–6.
230. Id. at *5.
231. Id. at *5 (“Abbott and Cordis rely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lear, Inc. v. Ad-
kins to argue that assignee estoppel in inapplicable.”) (citation omitted).
232. Fischell, 2018 WL 6243251, at *6.
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unfair to allow the plaintiffs to receive a royalty for an invalid patent,
but it is unfair to allow the public to continue to pay tribute for an
unchallenged and invalid patent.
D. The Presumption of Validity
The woes of even thinking about making an invalidity challenge are
multiplied by the presumption of validity that a patent carries and, as
a practical matter, by the substantial costs of litigation. An assignee,
therefore, has to overcome two barriers—assignee estoppel and the
presumption of validity. With these two high barriers standing in the
way of exposing invalid patents, Lear’s express concerns for the public
are hardly paid lip service.233 Even if permitted to bring a challenge,
an assignee still has to meet the difficult burden of showing why a
patent should be invalidated.234 Parties that are estopped from assert-
ing an invalidity challenge, even in a defense, are deprived of the judi-
cial considerations that reach the merits of an invalidity challenge.
As set forth in § 282 of the Patent Act, “A patent shall be presumed
valid.”235 When a company or individual seeks to assert patent inva-
lidity, the statute provides that “[t]he burden of establishing invalidity
of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such
invalidity.”236 The Supreme Court has shed light on this burden and
has made clear that it is a heavy one.237 In Microsoft v. i4i, Ltd., the
Court set out to determine Congress’ intent in the Patent Act of 1952,
since the statute is silent on the nature of a challenger’s burden.238
Rejecting the lesser burden of proof of a preponderance of the evi-
dence, the Court adopted Justice Cardozo’s opinion in the 1934 case
of Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Engineering Laboratories that
called for the “presumption not to be overthrown except by clear and
cogent evidence.”239 With a clear and convincing evidence standard in
place, an assignee that seeks to make an invalidity challenge has an
awful lot to show when it discovers that it possesses an invalid patent.
Most of the opinions for assignee estoppel are at the district level
and fail to reach the merits of an invalidity challenge. Sybron,
Baladevon, and Coast all contain the assertion of patent invalidity at
233. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 385 U.S. 653, 670–71 (1969).
234. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95–96 (2011).
235. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
236. § 282(a).
237. See Microsoft Corp., 564 U.S. at 95–96.
238. Id. at 98.
239. Id.; Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 2 (1934).
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summary judgment.240 In Coast, which held in favor of the application
of assignee estoppel, the court did not reach the merits of the invalid-
ity challenge despite Coast’s assertion that the patent was obtained by
fraud on the Patent Office.241 In decisions like these, courts should not
stop short when considering assignee estoppel simply because they
risk the continued existence of an invalid patent. At least the
MACOM court allowed the assertion of patent invalidity to pass the
pleading stage in a motion to strike.242 But still, the wide exposure of
specious patents continues to stand as a strong public concern.
For the two cases that appeared in the Federal Circuit and the Sev-
enth Circuit, these opinions both acknowledged evidence for each of
the patents’ invalidity.243 Specifically, courts should heed Roberts,
which, even after application of assignee estoppel, still considered the
prior art over the subject patent.244 Focusing on the merits of a pat-
ent’s validity should be the primary concern of an invalidity challenge,
not whether a party can raise the issue. In addition, if the doctrine of
assignee estoppel is abrogated, or at least seen as extinct, allowing
such challenges would shift the litigation landscape to more substan-
tive assertions of patent invalidity. And if a party has no good reason
for an invalidity challenge, and is purely seeking to repudiate royalty
payments, then this will at least dissuade parties from bringing a cause
of action and relieve the already clogged district courts.
240. Sybron involved a legal malpractice action on a motion to dismiss but the court set out to
determine whether the underlying case, decided at summary judgment, was properly deter-
mined. See Sybron Transition Corp. v. Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle, 770 F. Supp. 803, 809
(W.D.N.Y 1991) (“Because I conclude that the agreement created an assignment, I must now
determine whether Sybron, as assignee, would have been estopped in the Lansing litigation from
asserting its affirmative defenses alleging patent invalidity.”); Baladevon, Inc. v. Abbott Labs.,
Inc., 871 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1994); Coast Metals, Inc. v. Cape, No. 78-276, 1979 WL 25083
(D.N.J. Dec. 24, 1979).
241. See Count II in Coast Metals, Inc. v. Cape, No. 78-276, 1979 WL 25083, at *1 (D.N.J.
Dec. 24, 1979).
242. MACOM Tech. Sol. Holdings, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, No. 2:16-cv-02859-CAS, 2017
WL 3298670, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2017).
243. See generally Slip Track Sys. Inc., v. Metal Lite., 113 F. App’x 930, 933 (2004); Roberts v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 573 F.2d 976, 980–81 (7th Cir. 1978). The Roberts case appeared in the
the Seventh Circuit before the Federal Circuit had been established.
244. Roberts, 573 F.2d at 983 (“We have examined the record concerning the other prior art
evidence that was not admitted and about which Sears complains, and we conclude that the
district court properly applied its rule of limited relevance and thereby correctly excluded all of
it.”).
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III. IMPACT
A. The Public Importance of Validity Challenges
“The public” can seem like an illusory entity when considering
whether an assignee should be permitted to invalidate its own patent,
or why any party should be permitted to make an invalidity challenge.
It can be difficult to take the idea of “the public” out of the abstract.
But the Eighth Circuit has described the policy in the best light: “It
must be remembered that the public is a silent but an important and
interested party in all patent litigation, and is entitled to protection
against the monopolization of what is not lawfully patentable.”245
There must be a careful balancing between the Patent Office as a
vehicle for innovation but also a method for obtaining patent monop-
olies.246 Because the Patent Office can sometimes be a “rubber
stamp” of rights or be fooled by inequitable conduct, patentees have
the potential to possess large monopolies.247 With these considera-
tions in mind, patents are in a unique situation.248 So tiptoeing around
these patent monopolies is often left to the Patent Office and the
courts. The courts, of course, have the last say in the matter and must
make their own determinations as to the validity of a patent.249
The Supreme Court’s input suggests as much: “The far-reaching so-
cial and economic consequences of a patent . . . give the public a para-
mount interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring from
backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct and that
such monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope.”250 Permitting
the assertion of patent invalidity, especially by assignees, keeps these
245. Rota-Carb Corp. v. Frye Mfg. Co., 313 F.2d 443, 444 (8th Cir. 1963).
246. Economic monopolies have long been outlawed by the United States. The Sherman An-
titrust Act of 1890, later amended by the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, is a federal statute that
outlaws economic monopolies by preventing activities that impede competition and interstate
commerce in the marketplace. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-38 (2012). The United States has also
affirmed its position against monopolies with the enactment of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, which established the Federal Trade Commission to provide standards for business practices
and enforces the two antitrust acts. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)–(n), 57b-1(a)(8)(B) (1914).
247. Lemley & Sampat, supra note 37, at 181–82.
248. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971) (“Although
recognizing the patent system’s desirable stimulus to invention, we have also viewed the patent
as a monopoly which, although sanctioned by law, has the economic consequences attending
other monopolies.”).
249. Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[A] court is
not bound by the PTO’s actions and must make its own independent determination of patent
validity.”).
250. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945); see
also Blonder-Tongue Labs., 402 U.S. at 349–50 (The holder of a patent “should not be . . .
allowed to exact royalties for the use of an idea . . . that is beyond the scope of the patent
monopoly granted . . . .”).
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monopolies in check, regardless of whether the scenario involves the
alleged repudiation of royalty payments.
Skirting around the principles of assignee estoppel, the Court, in a
more recent opinion, has also said that “[m]ore is at stake when it
comes to patents than simply the dealings between the parties, which
can be addressed through contract law.”251 This is right on par with
the reasoning in Lear, in that the doctrines of contract law should give
way to the public importance of invalidity challenges.252 Moreover,
the peak of patent invalidity policy has come about in the dual deci-
sions of Oil States Energy Services, L.L.C. v. Greene’s Energy Group
and SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu.253 In SAS, the Supreme Court stated:
Sometimes, though, bad patents slip through. Maybe the invention
wasn’t novel, or maybe it was obvious all along, and the patent
owner shouldn’t enjoy the special privileges it has received. To rem-
edy these sorts of problems, Congress has long permitted parties to
challenge the validity of patent claims in federal court. More re-
cently, Congress has supplemented litigation with various adminis-
trative remedies.254
Allowing the expansion of forums for invalidity challenges beyond
courts speaks volumes to the way the Supreme Court feels about the
public importance of invalidity challenges. Other decisions by the
Court have the same effect. For instance, in Lear, the Court ignored
the specific language of the contract between Lear and Adkins that
precluded a challenge to patent validity, holding that state contract
law doctrine must give way to the express federal policy of the patent
laws.255 A more modern decision by the Second Circuit held that
“covenants barring future challenges to a patent’s validity entered into
prior to litigation are unenforceable, regardless of whether the agree-
ments containing such covenants are styled as settlement agreements
or simply as license agreements.”256 If a court, faced with the assertion
of patent invalidity by an assignee, wants to utilize an improper analy-
sis under assignor estoppel and accordingly balance the contractual
equities between parties, it should at least acknowledge the Supreme
Court’s message that patent validity challenges override any contract
dispute.
251. Impression Prod., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1538 (2017).
252. See generally Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
253. See generally Oil States Energy Servs., L.L.C. v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365
(2018); see also SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354 (2018).
254. SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. at 1353 (citation omitted).
255. See generally Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 295 U.S. 653 (1969).
256. Rates Tech. Inc. v. Speakeasy, Inc., 685 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir. 2012).
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Fraud or inequitable conduct before the Patent Office should al-
ways permit a party to assert patent invalidity. For example, if an ap-
plicant intentionally fails to disclose prior art but still obtains a patent,
there is no reason why the patentee should be able to exercise her
rights. The Supreme Court has long insisted that fraud associated with
obtaining a patent “does not concern only private parties. There are
issues of great moment to the public in a patent suit.”257 Allegations
of fraud or inequitable conduct should raise suspicions to a judiciary
charged with honoring the patent clause and the public interest. By
estopping assignees from asserting invalidity, the public remains ex-
cluded from manufacture, use, sale, or offer for sale of the infected
rights to a claimed invention.
B. The Purposes of the Patent System
Barring an assignee from challenging the validity of its own patent
cuts at the heart of the purposes of the patent system, and patent law
in general. From a broad perspective, patent protection is at the nu-
cleus of a validity challenge. The electrons floating around this nu-
cleus consist of the various purposes for the patent system.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has given this atomic environment a
closer look under the microscope.
Innovation
&
The Constitution
Public
Domain
Patent
Protection
Impeding
the Flow of
Information
Patent
Monopoly
Figure 1. The Patent System.
257. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944).
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Figure 1 is a theoretical representation of the purposes of the patent
system and the multiple considerations that the public, Congress, and
the Supreme Court attempt to balance.
At the center of Figure 1 is patent protection. It represents the epit-
ome of the patent system and simultaneously provides and receives
input from each of the four considerations of the patent system. It
serves as the intermediary between a dynamic patent system and
touches all spheres of influence. With assignee estoppel, patent pro-
tection is the driving force behind an invalidity challenge and is the
dispositive factor to winning or losing the case. If a court declines the
application of assignee estoppel, the assignee destroys her patent pro-
tection, thereby eliminating the four concerns of the patent system. If
it is applied, then all four concerns are affected and continue to inter-
act and overlap with each other.
At the top of Figure 1 is innovation, and the constitutional consider-
ations of Article I, Section 8, clause 8. The purpose of the constitu-
tional grant to enact the patent laws is to promote the progression of
science by providing exclusive rights to an inventor’s discovery.258
Supporting this idea, the Supreme Court has remarked that “the very
point of patents [is] to promote creation”.259 Abrogating assignee es-
toppel increases the threshold of innovation by allowing a court to
question the inventor’s creation. If the innovation is sound, and a
court upholds the patent’s validity, the public domain will continue to
receive the benefit of the process or machine but will still have to
respect the assignee’s monopoly for a limited period of time. But if a
patent deserves to be declared invalid, then the public’s knowledge
will no longer be impeded by the grant of the patent monopoly or
patent protection.
To the left Figure 1, in a vital sphere of influence, is the public do-
main. Of the various purposes of patent law noted by the Supreme
Court, the free dissemination of the inventor’s ideas into the public
domain is considered the most important aspect to fulfilling the con-
stitutional purposes of promoting the progress of sciences.260 This
258. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works,
261 U.S. 24, 35 (1923).
259. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013).
260. ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, JR., ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 1:2, Westlaw (database up-
dated July 2019); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829) (“While one of the great objective[s
of patent law] was, by holding out the reasonable reward to inventors, and giving them an exclu-
sive right to their inventions for a limited period, to stimulate the efforts of genius; the main
object was ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts,’ and this could be done best, by
giving the public at large a right to make, construct, use, and vend the thing invented, at as early
a period as possible; having due regard to the rights of the inventor.”).
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sphere overlaps with innovation and the grant of a patent monopoly.
The grant of a patent monopoly is a product of innovation and is often
motivated by the lucrative financial incentives that are offered by indi-
viduals or organizations in the public domain. In addition, the public’s
access to the claimed invention comes both during and after the mo-
nopoly. The Supreme Court has stated that “the federal patent laws
have embodied a careful balance between the need to promote inno-
vation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imi-
tation are both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a
competitive economy.”261 In other words, when a patentee is receiving
economic consideration for her innovation on the marketplace, it is
also to the benefit of the public to view that product and attempt to
advance the technology for the future development of the common
good. The limited grant of the patent monopoly is a means by which
the public can gain access to the products of an inventor’s innovation
after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.262 This
sphere is largely the tipping point of Lear and the reason why courts
that apply assignee estoppel are misplaced. Parties to a litigation in-
volving patents must not forget that patents were created to benefit
more than just the assignee. Assignee estoppel is a subatomic particle
within this large atom, a mere afterthought when considering what is
truly at stake—the public.
At the bottom Figure 1 is the monopoly of patent protection. This
represents the means of enforcement, the power of exclusion, and the
economic exploitations of a patentee. This sphere of influence over-
laps with each of the purposes of the patent system. It is clear that
“the patent system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encour-
ages both the creation and public disclosure of new and useful ad-
vances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a
limited period of time.”263 This special reward for innovation is in-
tended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors, and
therefore overlaps with innovation and the constitutional considera-
tions of the patent system.264 What makes assignee estoppel so futile is
the amount of time that litigation eats into the twenty-year grant of
261. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
262. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
263. Pfaff v. Wells Elec., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998); see also Beidler v. United States, 253
U.S. 447, 453 (1920) (“The source of power to grant patents, and the consideration for granting
them, is the advantage which the public will derive from them, especially after the expiration of
the patent monopoly, when the discoveries embodied in them shall become a part of the public
stock of knowledge.”).
264. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
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the patent monopoly.265 If a party spends three years in litigation with
an honest belief that the patent-in-suit is invalid, only to find out that
they cannot raise the issue in the first place, the patent remains invalid
during that time. That is three years where the assignee holds patent
protection and three years where the public continues to pay tribute
to the assignee. Another consideration is the period of time that pat-
entees are guaranteed to exercise their bundle of rights.
To the right Figure 1, also an important sphere of influence, is the
impediment to the flow of information. Notably, this sphere of influ-
ence does not overlap with the public domain because it deprives the
public of the full and free use of information. But it still touches inno-
vation and monopoly. The Supreme Court has noted the balance be-
tween these spheres, reasoning that “[o]n the one hand, the promise
of exclusive rights provides monetary incentives that lead to creation,
invention, and discovery. On the other hand, that very exclusivity can
impede the flow of information . . . .”266 Upon further economic con-
sideration, there is also “[t]he balance between the interest in motivat-
ing innovation and enlightenment by rewarding invention with patent
protection on the one hand, and the interest in avoiding monopolies
that unnecessarily stifle competition on the other . . . .”267 This sphere
does not directly relate to assignee estoppel, inasmuch as an invalid
patent left unchallenged does not impede the flow of information.
Only a valid patent impedes the flow of information because it pre-
vents others from exploiting a beneficial and innovative claimed in-
vention. But a party that is allowed to go on and sell products based
on an invalid patent should still not be allowed to impede the flow of
information. Courts should not allow these parties to carve out a slice
of innovation and hold hostage inventions that may possibly infringe
on an invalid patent. This sphere, however, is still a benefit to a wor-
thy patentee who is on the other end of the bargain and gets to exer-
cise enforcement, exact tribute from the public, and exploit the fruits
of her labor.
Figure 1 is merely a representation of the interplay between the
purposes of the patent system. Though assignee estoppel may seem
like a single neutron in the nucleus of patent protection, it is still a
part of the larger considerations for the purposes of the patent system
and can therefore affect the public, innovation, the monopoly of a pat-
ent, and the flow of information.
265. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012).
266. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012).
267. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 63.
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CONCLUSION
With courts taking note of the instability of assignee estoppel, this
“doctrine” should just be put to rest. Whether it be to avoid further
confusion between assignor estoppel, to apply the policy implications
of Lear, or to actually determine whether a patent is valid or not, as-
signee estoppel should no longer be a burden to parties who raise the
issue of patent invalidity. When courts apply assignee estoppel, it is
the public who are the silent victims, and the party who misappropri-
ated the innovation or continues to hold an invalid invention is re-
warded. This simply cannot be. Even in the case of repudiation of
royalty payments, it denigrates the patent system to allow patent pro-
tection to go unquestioned. In the end, patents are fenced in with a
presumption of validity anyway, and a challenger already has enough
to deal with. What we should strive for is the opportunity to promote
good patents that enhance our society, not bad ones that continue to
rob us.
Sean Calvin Sparrow†
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